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Abstract 
 
A group authentication protocol authenticates pre-defined groups of individuals such that: 
• No individual is identified 
• No knowledge of which groups can be successfully authenticated is known to the 
verifier 
• No sensitive data is exposed 
The paper presents a group authentication protocol based on splitting the private keys of 
the Naccache-Stern public-key cryptosystem in such a way that the Boolean expression 
defining the authenticable groups is implicit in the split. 
 
Introduction 
 
Acme Inc. has a corporate airplane.  The Acme  corporate plane can only be used by 
Acme employees.  Any trip must include at least two employees and at least one must be 
a manager.  On both privacy and security grounds Acme does not want to identify which 
individuals are aboard any trip on the airplane. 
 
Suppose Acme has five employees.  A and B are managers while C, D, and E are non-
managers.  Acme’s airplane usage policy can be expressed as follows: 
 
(A and B) or ((A or B) and (C or D or E)) 
 
To implement its usage and privacy policy Acme splits a private key among the 
employees in a way that only groups of employees that satisfy this Boolean expression 
can use the plane.  Acme puts each key share on a separate security token. 
 
When a group of individuals arrives at the airport, they present their smart cards to an 
untrusted verifier.  The verifier generates a random challenge, encrypts it with Acme’s 
public key and provides the result to each of the tokens.  Each token process the data it is 
given and returns a response to the verifier. The verifier combines the responses from the 
tokens and if the combination equals the original random number, the group of individual 
is permitted to use the Acme airplane.  Otherwise, the group is not permitted to use the 
Acme airplane. 
 
Group Authentication 
 
This example illustrates three desirable properties of a group authentication protocol: 
 
1. A group can be authenticated as a unit without authenticating any individual 
member of the group. 
2. The verifier need not know the definition of the group or groups that can be 
successfully authenticated. 
3. The authentication can be performed by an untrusted entity without reconstructing 
any sensitive data. 
 
The particular application circumstance that motivated this work is a multi-entity 
transaction system wherein we wish to control which entities can co-operate in forming a 
transaction without identifying individual entities and without handling any sensitive 
data. 
 
Previous Work 
 
There are many key splitting and key sharing schemes.  An extensive bibliography is 
provided by Stinson and Ruizhong [9] and an overview by Seberry et al [8]. Benaloh and 
Leichter [2] show that keys can be split and shared so that only groups satisfying an 
arbitrary AND/OR Boolean expression can reconstruct the secret key.  There are 
threshold (k-of-n) key sharing schemes that enable group authentication without 
recreating the secret key, for example the protocol of Suida, Freund and Huang [6].  
Representing key shares as subsequences of binary sequences has been considered by 
number of authors including Anderson [1], Davida [3], Massey[4], and McEliece and 
Sarwate [5]. 
 
The Naccache-Stern Public-Key Cryptosystem 
 
Naccache and Stern [6] present a public-key cryptosystem based on the knapsack 
problem.  We present herein a method whereby the private key of the Naccache-Stern 
system can be shared among a set of key holders in a way that satisfies the above 
properties of a group authentication protocol. 
 
The decryption function of the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem is given by: 
 
m = Σ { 2i | pi is a factor of cs mod p } 
 
where P = {pi} is a set of prime numbers, p is a prime greater than Π pi, c is the 
ciphertext and s is the secret key. 
 
Naccache-Stern Key Splitting Relative to an AND/OR Boolean Expression 
 
Let A = {Aj} be a set of key holders and let B be an AND/OR Boolean expression over 
A.  For example, if A = {A1, A2, A3} then B might be 
 
(A1 and A2) or (A1 and A3) 
 
Apply the algorithm of Benaloh and Leichter [2] to partition the set P into parts Pj 
according to B.  In the language of [1], a set is moved across an AND operator in B by 
partitioning the set arbitrarily into non-null subsets and across an OR operator in B by 
duplicating the set. At the conclusion of the algorithm, set Pj to the union of all sets 
associated with the variable Aj.  Pj is non-null for all j since without loss of generality 
each Aj is mentioned at least once in B. 
 
The tuple (Pj, s) is Aj’s share of the private key. Aj’s contribution, mj, to the decryption of 
a ciphertext c is given by 
mj = Σ { 2i | pi ∈ Pj and pi is a factor of cs mod p } 
 
and the plaintext message m is given by 
 
m = Σ mj 
 
where we take Σ to be bitwise non-exclusive logical OR. 
 
A Small Example 
 
Suppose A = {A1, A2, A3} are three entities that according to the governing policy may 
only co-operate according to the Boolean expression 
 
(A1 and A2) or (A1 and A3) 
 
That is, A1 and A2 may co-operate and A1 and A3 may co-operate but A2 and A3 may not 
co-operate in the absence of A1 nor can any of them act alone. 
 
When any group of entities attempt to co-operate, the untrusted verifier generates a 
random message m, encrypts it using the public key of the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem, 
and sends the resulting ciphertext c to each entity as a challenge.  If and only if the 
responses from the entities are such that  
m = Σ mj  
 
are the entities are allowed to co-operate. 
 
For a specific example, consider the public key cryptosystem given as "a small example" 
in the Naccache-Stern paper [6]. For this system, n = 7, P = {2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19}, 
and s = 5,642,069.  If the random message m is 202, then the challenge c computed using 
the public key and provided to each token is 
 
c = Π vixi mod p = 7202882 
where 
m = Σ 2xi 
 
Suppose the secret key has been divided among the three entities as follows:  
 
P1 = {2, 3, 5, 7} and P2 = P3 = {11, 13, 17, 19} 
 
Then 
 
m1 = Σ { 2i | pi ∈ { 2, 3, 5, 7} and pi is a factor of 202}= 23 v 21 
 
and 
 
m2 = m3 = Σ { 2i | pi ∈ {11, 13, 17, 19} and pi is a factor of 202}= 27 v 26 
 
 
Non-Monotonic Access Structures 
 
Returning to the example in the first section, it should be noted that application of the 
Benaloh and Leichter algorithm to Acme’s Boolean expression does not enforce the 
restriction imposed by the seating capacity of the airplane.  The group {A, B, C, D} for 
example would be successfully authenticated using above formulation. 
 
The Benaloh and Leichter algorithm as well as much of the work on shared keys 
considers only monotone access structures; viz. if a subset of A’ of A is allowed and A’ 
⊂ A”, then A” is allowed. In some group authentication contexts this monotonicity 
condition is not acceptable.  We may, for example, wish to allow an entity to form a 
transaction in  co-operation with some entities but not in the concurrent presence of 
others. 
 
One method of realizing non-monotone access structures; that is structures defined by 
Boolean expressions including the NOT operator as well as AND and OR; provides each 
key holder with an ordered sequence of key shares and retrieves an ordered sequence of 
responses to the challenge. The ith response of a key holder j to the challenge, rij is 
computed using the key holder j’s ith share. 
 
For non-monotonic access structures, we take the response merging function Σ to be the 
arithmetic sum or XOR of the key holder responses rather than the non-exclusive OR.  
The overall response r is given by 
 
r = (r1, r2, …, rn) = (Σ r1j, Σ r2j, …, Σ rnj) 
 
If ri = m for any i, then the group is successfully authenticated. 
 
Another Example 
 
In the corporate airplane example, the groups we wish to successfully authenticate are 
AB, AC, AD, AE, ACD, ABC, ABD, ABE, ACE, ADE, BC, BD, BE, BCD, BCE and 
BDE.   
 
To form a Naccache-Stern public-key cryptosystem we take 
 
P = {2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37}, 
 
p = 7420738134871, 
 
and set the private key, s, to 
s = 5642069 
 
The public key of this cryptosystem is given by 
 
v[0] = 1042080239371  v[6] = 6408801185994 
v[1] = 6961378167419  v[7] = 6664307396372 
v[2] = 556387338943  v[8] = 6792283659586 
v[3] = 6467374518496  v[9] = 4009453191992 
v[4] = 6101909563954  v[10] = 4858036635332 
v[5] = 7161849266528  v[11] = 3535089085276 
 
Table 1 shows the key share sequence placed on each employee’s token to authenticate 
the 13 subsets of {A, B, C, D, E} needed for the corporate airplane example. 
 
Sequence 
Index 
A B C D E Group(s) 
Authenticated
1 2, 3, 5, 7, 
11, 13 
2, 3, 5, 7, 
11, 13 
17, 19, 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
17, 19, 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
17, 19, 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
AC, AD, AE, 
BC, BD, BE 
2 2, 3, 5, 7 11, 13, 
17, 19 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
ABC, ABD, 
ABE 
3 2, 3, 5, 7  11, 13, 
17, 19 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
ACD, ACE 
4  2, 3, 5, 7 11, 13, 
17, 19 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
BCD, BCE 
5 2, 3, 5, 7   11, 13, 
17, 19 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
ADE 
6  2, 3, 5, 7  11, 13, 
17, 19 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
BDE 
7 2, 3, 5, 7, 
11, 13 
17, 19, 
23, 29, 
31, 37 
   AB 
 
Table 1. Key Share Sequences Held by Each Employee 
 
The encryption of the random number 2919 = 101101100111 using the public key is m = 
1073741824.  The series of responses from each employee smart card is given in Table 2. 
 
Sequence 
Index 
A B C D E Groups(s) 
Authenticated
1 39 39 2880 2880 2880 AC, AD, AE, 
BC, BD, BE 
2 7 96 2816 2816 2816 ABC, ABD, 
ABE 
3 7 1 96 2816 2816 ACD, ACE 
4 1 7 96 2816 2816 BCD, BCE 
5 7 1 1 96 2816 ADE 
6 1 7 1 96 2816 BDE 
7 39 1 2880 1 1 AB 
 
Table 2. Response Sequences from Each Employee Token 
 
Variations of this basic approach include using a different random number for each 
response in the sequence and having the null response of a key holder be a non-zero 
random number rather than simply 1. 
 
Summary 
 
A method for sharing the private key of a Naccache-Stern public-key cryptosystem 
among a set of key holders such that only subsets satisfying an arbitrary Boolean 
expression can decrypt a message encrypted with the system’s public key has been 
described.  The decryption of a message encrypted with the public key of the system can 
be obtained without identifying any member of the group, without revealing the Boolean 
expression defining the group, and without bringing the private key into being. 
 
The method is useful for enforcing security policies expressed in terms Boolean 
expressions over groups of entities.  It provides implicit and simultaneous authentication 
of the group members together with the evaluation of the policy statement governing 
their co-operation. 
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